UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1205
30 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting with regret the resignation of Judge Stephen Schwebel, taking effect on 29 February 2000,

Noting further that a vacancy in the International Court of Justice for the remainder of the term of office of Judge Stephen Schwebel will thus occur and must be filled in accordance with the terms of the Statute of the Court,

Noting that, in accordance with Article 14 of the Statute, the date of the election to fill the vacancy shall be fixed by the Security Council,

Decides that the election to fill the vacancy shall take place on 2 March 2000 at a meeting of the Security Council and at a meeting of the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session.

99-36762 (E) 301199

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1206
29 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF DJIBOUTI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the declaration of the seventh Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, held in Djibouti on 26 November 1999 (annex I) and the resolution on the Somali peace initiative and proposals of the President of the Republic of Djibouti adopted at the Summit (annex II).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Roble OLHAYE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-36544 (E) 011299

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Annex I

Declaration issued on 26 November 1999 in Djibouti by the seventh Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

The Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development met in Djibouti on November 26, 1999 under the Chairmanship of H.E. Mr. Ismaël Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti, and having carried out extensive discussions on a number of issue-economic, political and others, including issues pertaining to the further enhancement of the effectiveness of the Organisation-agreed on the following:

1. On Maintaining the Momentum In the Revitalisation of the Organisation

The Heads of State and Government, reiterating their commitment to the revitalisation of IGAD, renewed their resolve to continue, with a redoubled effort, to work towards making the Organisation an effective instrument for Sub-regional co-operation in all the areas referred to in its Charter.

In this connection, the Heads of State and Government expressed their conviction that Sub-regional co-operation among the countries of the region within the framework of IGAD has no realistic substitution. Accordingly, they emphasised that regardless of the setbacks in regional co-operation because of recent complications in bilateral relations among some member states, the strategic objectives of Sub-regional co-operation which are the mandates of IGAD to promote, should not be held hostage.

The Heads of State and Government agreed in this regard to explore possibilities for speeding up the pace of Sub-regional co-operation within IGAD on the basis of a fast track approach among those prepared and willing to jointly inject greater dynamism in Sub-regional co-operation based on the principles and objectives of the Organisation.

2. On Necessary Steps Towards Trust-Building Among Member States

The Heads of State and Government, taking note of the recent complications in bilateral relations among some member states and having drawn the necessary lessons from these, agreed on the need to enhance mutual confidence and trust among member states. In this connection, they expressed their conviction that a firm foundation of such relations lies in the scrupulous observance by all of principles of international law governing inter-state relations and in the unfailing and practical commitment to principles enshrined in the Charters of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity. They emphasised that recent developments have shown without doubt that the sources of bilateral strains and conflicts in the Sub-region lie in failure to abide strictly by principles of international law and to scrupulously observe internationally accepted norms of conduct in inter-state relations.

Accordingly, the Heads of State and Government agreed to do whatever is necessary, individually and collectively, to work towards ensuring that the rule of law is respected in our sub-region and that our sub-region will be free of discord within and between states.

3. On the Resolution of On-going Conflicts in the Sub-region

3.1. On the Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea

The Heads of State and Government expressed their hope that this tragic conflict would be resolved peacefully on the basis of the on-going facilitation by the OAU and its current Chairman.

3.2. On the Crisis in Somalia

The Heads of State and Government expressed their full support to the initiative taken recently by H.E. President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh on the crisis in Somalia. They agreed that the proposal made by Djibouti is fully in conformity with the general approach approved by the Authority in March 1998 in Djibouti and builds upon that decision and injects greater clarity into what needs to be done by IGAD and our partners to remove the obstacles to national reconciliation in Somalia.

Encouraged by the work of the Standing Committee on Somalia, the Heads of

State and Government called on the international community as a whole to co-operate more effectively with IGAD with the view to enhancing the role of Civil Society in Somalia for making a difference for peace in that country and for national reconciliation.

The Heads of State and Government reiterated once again that there is no alternative for peace in Somalia to pushing forward with the building block and the bottom-up approach in which the role of warlords is contained and that of Civil Society is enhanced. They agreed that peace in Somalia and the welfare of its people cannot be allowed to continue to be held hostage to the narrow and personal interests of those who have failed to save Somalia from continuing calamity. They called for and end to the political tourism carried out by Somali warlords and underlined the need for countries not to co-operate with those in Somalia that hinder the peace process.

The Heads of State and Government reiterated that those in Somalia who have so far sought to promote peace in their respective regions by encouraging the participation of Civil Society such as "Somaliland" later "Puntland" and more recently the region of Bay and Bakool and others, need the encouragement of the countries of the Sub-region and of the international community in general. They stressed the need for the international community to be forthcoming in providing assistance to make the peace dividend approach viable and to promote reconstruction effort underway in the various parts of the country. In this regard they called for the early realization of the UN Trust Fund for Somalia.

The Heads of State and Government, expressing appreciation to H.E. President Ismail Omar Guelleh for the initiative that he has already taken, encouraged Djibouti to pursue the initiative with greater vigour to ensure success. In this connection, they agreed on the speedy working out of the detailed implementation mechanism of the new initiative in co-operation with other members of IGAD and with all those who wish to contribute to national reconciliation in Somalia.

The Heads of State and Government emphasized that the situation in Somalia has not only continued to be a nightmare to its own people but has also grown by the day to be a source of serious concern to the countries of the region. Somalia, they agreed, cannot be allowed to be a haven for all sorts of criminals and terrorist groups who have the intention of making the whole region lawless and outside the rule of law. While appealing to the international community not to disregard the implications of this potential danger, they condemned all those

third parties who have chosen to exacerbate the crisis in Somalia, to push Somalia further into the abyss and to create chaos in the Sub-region through their co-operation with terrorist groups.

3.3. IGAD Peace Process in Southern Sudan

The Heads of State and Government expressed their appreciation to H.E. President Arap Moi for the lead role he continue to play for peace in the Sudan. They reiterated that the Declaration of Principles continue to provide an effective and just basis for resolving the crisis in the Sudan, particularly for national reconciliation which would pave the way for bringing to an end the conflict in the South.

The Heads of State and Government expressed the preparedness of IGAD to co-operate with all those with keen interest to contribute to national reconciliation in Sudan based on the principles expounded in the DOP and already accepted by the two parties in the IGAD process. The IGAD initiative is an African initiative and should remain so.

4. On other areas of Co-operation

The Heads of State and Government took note with concern the fact that given the reality faced by the Organization the pace with which their co-operation in other areas is proceeding has been far from satisfactory. In this regard, they agreed to do whatever is necessary to inject new dynamism into their co-operation in the economic area. They expressed their hope that partners will continue to provide effective co-operation to IGAD with the view to bringing about greater integration among the countries of the Sub-region. The Heads of State and Government reiterated the need for pushing forward with greater speed the pace of economic integration among the countries of the Sub-region. They agreed that there is a need to look into the possibilities for a faster track approach among those who see benefit in such an approach and based on the principales and objectives of the Organisation.

They Further agreed on the need of an immediate institutional assessment with the view to improve dramatically IGAD's organisational operations, effectiveness and quality performance.

In view of the critical need to develop the regional infrastructure, such as road and railway links among member countries, the Heads of State and Government

underlined the importance of involving the private sector to participate in regional infrastructural investment. In this regard, they agreed to convene under the auspices of IGAD and with the participation of partners, a conference that brings together the private sector, financial institutions and public enterprises, both within and outside the region.

Annex II

Resolution on the Somali peace initiative and proposals of the President of Djibouti adopted on 26 November 1999 at the seventh Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

We, Heads of State and Government of IGAD member States meeting in Djibouti on November 26, 1999 on the occasion of the 7th IGAD Summit.

Considering the seriousness of the war situation prevailing in Somalia due to the absence of a central Government since 1991,

Considering further the commendable efforts made, especially by Ethiopia (country mandated by IGAD) and the OAU, the Arab League and the United Nations in order to settle the internal conflict in Somalia.

Reaffirming the crucial role IGAD has to play in the settlement of this conflict and the restoration of peace in the region.

Considering further the proposals contained in the speech of his Excellency ISMAEL OMAR GUELLEH, president of the Republic of Djibouti before the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday, September 22nd. 1999.

Aware of the legitimate expectation of the Somali people in particular, from IGAD, the OAU, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference Organisation and the United Nations to finalise the proposals made by the President of the Republic of Djibouti.

Convinced that at this stage, it is crucial to institutionalise the peace initiative for Somalia, proposed by the President of the Republic of Djibouti and current IGAD Chairman.

Recommending the need to further elaborate the initiative forwarded by the President of Republic of Djibuti, H.E. Mr. Ismaïl Omar Guelleh.

Decide:

1. To embrace these proposals and provide total support to the initiative and proposals of the President of the Republic of Djibouti and current IGAD Chairman in order to bring to fruition the Somali peace process.

To further elaborate in detail the proposal put forwarded by the President of the Republic of Djibouti, H.E. Mr. Ismail Omar Guelleh and to develop a mechanism of its implementation as soon as possible.

Urge the international community to support the Djibouti peace proposal.

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Security Council

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S/1999/1207
30 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999, 1258 (1999) of 6 August 1999 and 1273 (1999) of 5 November 1999 and the statements of its President of 31 August 1998 (S/PRST/1998/26), 11 December 1998 (S/PRST/1998/36) and 24 June 1999 (S/PRST/1999/17),

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all States in the region,

Reaffirming also that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815) represents the most viable basis for a resolution of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and noting the role it requests the United Nations to play in the implementation of the ceasefire,

Expressing its concern at the alleged violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and urging all parties to refrain from any declarations or action that could jeopardize the peace process,

Stressing the responsibilities of the signatories for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, and calling on them to permit and facilitate the full deployment of United Nations military liaison officers and other personnel necessary for the fulfilment of their mandate throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Welcoming the pledges of support made to the Joint Military Commission (JMC) by States and organizations, and calling on others to contribute, together with the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement, to the funding of the body,

Noting with concern the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and calling on all Member States to contribute to current and future consolidated humanitarian appeals,

Expressing its concern at the severe consequences of the conflict for the security and well-being of the civilian population throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Expressing also its concern at the adverse impact of the conflict on the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in the eastern parts of the country, and the continuing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Having considered the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in his report of 1 November 1999 (S/1999/1116),

Reiterating the importance of the successful completion of the mission of the technical assessment team dispatched to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to assess conditions and to prepare for possible subsequent United Nations deployment in the country as well as to obtain firm guarantees from the parties to the conflict over the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Underlining the importance of the full deployment of the United Nations military liaison personnel as provided for by resolution 1258 (1999),

1. Calls upon all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, to implement fully the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement, and to use the JMC to resolve disputes over military issues;

2. Stresses the need for a continuing process of genuine national reconciliation, encourages all Congolese to participate in the national dialogue to be organized in coordination with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and calls upon all Congolese parties and the OAU to finalize agreement on the facilitator for the national dialogue;

3. Welcomes the appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo to serve as the head of the United Nations presence in the subregion relating to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to provide assistance in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement;

4. Decides that the personnel authorized under its resolutions 1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999), including a multidisciplinary staff of personnel in the fields of human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, medical support, child protection, political affairs and administrative support, which will assist the Special Representative, shall constitute the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 1 March 2000;

5. Decides also that MONUC, led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, consistent with resolutions 1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999), shall carry out the following ongoing tasks:

(a) To establish contacts with the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement at their headquarters levels, as well as in the capitals of the States signatories;

(b) To liaise with the JMC and provide technical assistance in the implementation of its functions under the Ceasefire Agreement, including in the investigation of ceasefire violations;

(c) To provide information on security conditions in all areas of its operation, with emphasis on local conditions affecting future decisions on the introduction of United Nations personnel;

(d) To plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces;

(e) To maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees, children, and other affected persons, and assist in the protection of human rights, including the rights of children;

6. Underlines that the phased deployment of United Nations military observers with the necessary support and protection elements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be subject to its further decision, and expresses its intention to take such a decision promptly on the basis of further recommendations of the Secretary-General, taking into account the findings of the technical assessment team;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to accelerate the development of a concept of operations based on assessed conditions of security, access and freedom of movement and cooperation on the part of the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed and to report to it as soon as possible on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and submit his recommendations on further deployment of United Nations personnel in the country and on their protection;

* * *

9. Requests the Secretary-General, with immediate effect, to take the administrative steps necessary for the equipping of up to 500 United Nations military observers with a view to facilitating future rapid United Nations deployments as authorized by the Council;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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S/1999/1208
30 November 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you as follows:

At 1230 hours on 28 November 1999 United States and British aircraft coming from bases in Turkish territory committed a fresh act of wanton aggression when they attacked residential areas in Ninawa Governorate in northern Iraq. They directly targeted the Zanabiq ("Lilies") elementary school in the Masarif residential neighbourhood of the city of Mosul, firing a high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM). Ten civilians, including four children at the school, were seriously wounded. A number of dwellings in the area were also destroyed in the attack, as were two civilian motor vehicles. It should be noted that in this residential neighbourhood there are no military targets, whether fixed or mobile, and no anti-aircraft artillery batteries.

We condemn these recurring criminal acts of aggression against the territory and people of the Republic of Iraq, and we request you to intervene with the Security Council so that it may fully meet the responsibilities entrusted to it under the Charter of the United Nations by taking whatever measures are necessary to induce the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to halt the acts of aggression in which they are engaging against Iraq.

In accordance with the principles of State responsibility, we affirm the legally established right of the Republic of Iraq to seek compensation for all the losses, in terms of human, material and moral damage, that have been sustained by Iraq and its people owing to acts of aggression that are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-36831 (E) 011299 011299

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S/1999/1209
30 November 1999
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LETTER DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to present hereunder Iraq's comments on your report dated 12 November 1999 on the implementation of phase VI under the memorandum of understanding of 20 May 1996 and the oil-for-food programme (S/1999/1162).

I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

In our letter dated 11 September 1999 (S/1999/968), we stated Iraq's objections to the approach adopted in preparing the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the memorandum of understanding and the oil-for-food programme, an approach that is marked by selectivity and a preference for negative political formulations and one that ignores many of the facts concerning the shortcomings of the programme at a time when all aspects of the humanitarian situation in Iraq are in decline owing to the maintenance of the general sanctions imposed on the country on 6 August 1990. Most regrettably, the report of 12 November 1999 on the implementation of the memorandum of understanding adopts the same biased approach as before. Some examples that support this conclusion are given hereunder.

1. The report lacks an objective approach to evaluating the repercussions of the implementation of the programme on the overall humanitarian situation in Iraq in that it neglects to make a comparative analysis of the present situation and the situation in the relevant sectors as it was prior to the imposition of sanctions and in that it ignores the cumulative impact of the sanctions on all the economic, social and cultural aspects of life for the Iraqi people, including future generations.

2. The procedure stipulated in paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 986 (1995), requiring the report to be prepared on the basis of consultations with Iraq, has not been followed.

3. The report does not refer in an unambiguous and precise manner to the adverse impact that the holds placed on contracts by the United States and the United Kingdom have had on the implementation of the programme and on the humanitarian situation in Iraq in general, and it does not speak of the mendacious pretexts cited by the Americans and the British in order to justify

the holds placed on contracts for food and medicine and other humanitarian items. These include the pretext that many civilian items have dual-use possibilities, and examples include electricity generators and water pumps and the related spare parts as well as medical equipment (contracts 50789, 50877, 600109 and 600333). The programme itself is nevertheless persuaded that these contracts fall within the requirements of the memorandum of understanding and are for items included in the distribution plan, and it has submitted them for approval to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) (the 661 Committee) as having met all of the conditions.

4. It is stated in subparagraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 2 of annex I to the report that the sum of $125.4 million "had been allotted to cover the operating expenditures of the Compensation Commission" and the sum of $382.9 million "has been allocated for the operational and administrative expenses of the United Nations". This means that the administrative expenses of the United Nations associated with the implementation of Security Council resolution 986 (1995) have exceeded half a billion dollars. The programme's exorbitant administrative expenses and the other extravagant deductions are depriving Iraq of a significant portion of its revenues at the time it most needs them to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by military aggression and by the general sanctions that have been maintained for more than nine years.

5. The report neglects to mention the 661 Committee's inability to improve its procedures and facilitate the implementation of the programme because of the extremist interpretations given to them by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. These flout Iraq's rights, whether with regard to its entitlement to request companies to post performance bonds, or in connection with expediting the procedure for reimbursements between the 13 per cent account and the 53 per cent account or on other matters.

6. The report does not refer to the great damage being caused by the lengthy and complex procedures or to the delays in the processing, submission and implementation of contracts that have led to the accumulation of more than $5 billion in cash in the Iraq Account at a time when these funds must be spent immediately or as quickly as possible in order to pay for contracts for humanitarian items.

7. The report ignores the issue of the use of depleted uranium against Iraq by United States and British forces, the environmental and health catastrophe that it has caused and the repercussions it has had on public health in Iraq and, in particular, on Iraqi children. The programme has given no thought to any effort to help rid Iraq's environment of the effects of a radioactive weapon that is killing tens of thousands of Iraq's children every year and that will have enduring consequences for future generations.

II. DETAILED OBSERVATIONS BY SECTOR

1. Health

(a) The statement made in paragraph 31 of the report to the effect that the Ministry of Health had failed to provide escorts is inexact. The Ministry

organizes the monitoring process undertaken by United Nations observers in a systematic manner, in accordance with the schedules submitted by the Office of the Coordinator of the Humanitarian Programme on a periodic and ongoing basis for visits to warehouses, whether in Baghdad or the other governorates, and for visits to all health facilities in all parts of Iraq. In connection with the observations made concerning the Multidisciplinary Observation Unit, no formal request was received from the Unit for a visit to the central warehouses in Baghdad. They telephoned for an escort to be provided for a visit scheduled to take place on the same day as the telephone call. This was not reasonable, because no escorts were available at that moment. The Unit was therefore told to send a formal letter with a request to visit the warehouses so that escorts could accordingly be provided on the day of the visit. It should be noted that the Unit failed to send a formal letter designating the date and destination of the requested visits, as is the practice of the Geographical Observation Unit.

(b) With regard to the statements made in paragraph 46 of the report concerning shortages of medical equipment, we confirm that there is a great need for medical and services-related equipment and other supplies for our health institutions. In view of the high cost of these items and given that the amounts allocated to the health sector in each phase have not been sufficient to pay for all of Iraq's needs in terms of medicines and medical and services-related equipment and supplies, the Ministry of Health has endeavoured to secure the aforesaid items throughout the various phases under the memorandum of understanding in accordance with priorities established with a view to meeting all immediate needs. According to the observers, the distribution of medical equipment was held up for four months in the central warehouses. The situation is that the medical equipment delivered to the warehouses has to undergo various processes of evaluation by committees of medical and engineering specialists, it requires accessory equipment, and technicians and operators must be trained. Some such equipment also requires pre-installation preparations, such as the laying of water and electricity connections, and this sometimes requires the presence of experts from the suppliers. Because the Ministry of Health needs this equipment for its medical facilities, it makes a diligent effort to shorten the time needed to complete the requirements indicated above.

(c) Paragraph 46 of the report also states that the 50:50 ratio established between drugs and medical equipment should be fully implemented. The requirements of the health sector for drugs and for medical supplies are, of course, interlinked. What use would it be to secure drugs in the absence of the equipment that helps in the diagnosis of illnesses? What would be the use of laboratory diagnosis in the absence of the equipment and supplies needed to conduct surgical procedures? Is it possible for patients to stay in hospitals, in a climate such as Iraq's, if heating and cooling supplies are not available? Is it possible to benefit from drugs when there are no storage or distribution facilities to deliver them to the end-user? This situation requires that the Ministry of Health should be given a degree of flexibility in disbursing the funds allocated to the health sector without being restricted by predetermined ratios so that the health services provided to citizens can operate in an integrated manner.

(d) As indicated in paragraph 49, diagnosed cases of polio in Iraq are still on the rise. The total number of reported cases is 55. Thirty were

diagnosed as confirmed cases by the national polio laboratory and have been further confirmed by the World Health Organization (WHO) reference laboratory in Cairo. For 22 cases the virus was isolated in our laboratories, and corroborating results have yet to be reported by the WHO reference laboratories. The three remaining cases have been classified as polio on the basis of clinical diagnosis. We should like to state that the reports sent by the Ministry of Health to WHO and UNICEF show that routine immunization coverage of infants in their first year of life declined during 1998 and 1999, and this fact was confirmed by the field survey conducted by Ministry staff in December. This situation has been caused by the suspension of operations by the mobile teams for lack of vehicles, repeated disruptions in the electricity supply, the shortage of cold-chain equipment and the lack of spare parts - all owing to the circumstances created by the general embargo - and by the delayed shipment of vaccines by suppliers as a result of the complex procedures for processing contracts under the memorandum of understanding. As urgent measures to remedy this situation, the Ministry of Health conducted two rounds of national immunization days using polio vaccine. The first round was conducted on 4, 5 and 6 October 1999 and the second on 8, 9 and 10 November 1999. The second round was followed by a field survey using the WHO cluster sampling technique in order to gauge the level of coverage after the completion of the two rounds. The data and statistics obtained in the survey will be analyzed at a subsequent stage.

(e) Concerning the distribution network, mentioned in paragraph 51 of the report, we should like to state that the adequacy of the network depends on the availability of vehicles, storage-related supplies and communications. The Ministry of Health has endeavoured to improve the efficiency of the network by securing the required supplies from local sources or concluding contracts under the memorandum of understanding. Because most such supplies are not available from local sources and because the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the 661 Committee are impeding the approval of contracts relating to this sector, the orderly distribution of medicines and their delivery to end-users have been adversely affected despite timely and sustained efforts to secure the items necessary to improve performance by enhancing the efficiency of warehouse handling and expanding the distribution network.

2. Water and sanitation

(a) The report states (in paragraph 54) that the rate of water production has improved in 64 per cent of water treatment plants, 35 per cent of water compact units and 21 per cent of water booster stations. These figures indicate that the rate at which water production has improved in water compact units and water booster stations has been slow. This is because a large number of the relevant contracts have been placed on hold, including the contracts for ductile piping under phases IV and V (Nos. 4771 and 50847) and the contract for the supply of spare parts for water compact units (No. 5877). These are examples of the pending contracts to which reference was made in the UNICEF report of 12 August 1999. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the 661 Committee have held up contracts for this sector, which is one of a humanitarian character, that are worth a total of more than $60 million and which include 16 contracts for supplies that are essential and basic to the

maintenance of existing water treatment plants and water compact units throughout Iraq.

(b) The report does not address the ongoing deterioration of drainage and sanitation networks, the great number of blockages and subsidences they contain or the breakdown of principal and secondary stations. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the 661 Committee have placed on hold a contract for the importation of sewer cleaning equipment under phase IV (No. 4723) and a contract for the supply of diesel pumps (for sewers) under phase V (No. 50861). These items are essential for sanitation and the cleaning of sewer networks.

(c) The delayed approval of contracts, in a process that takes between six months and one year, has been a major factor in causing a number of companies to default and to be unable to meet their obligations owing to the intervening worldwide rise in oil prices and the consequent rise in the prices of inputs to manufacturing. All of this subsequently leads to contracts remaining unfulfilled and to the disruption of the programme for the rehabilitation of water treatment plants in this important humanitarian sector.

(d) The low figures given in paragraph 53 indicate the ratio between quantities of supplies contracted and quantities delivered, clearly demonstrating the inefficiency of the present system under the memorandum of understanding. Since this sector is a dynamic one in terms of its needs, the ranking of priorities will always be subject to piecemeal adjustments that require a rapid reaction. The present system clearly does not allow this. The levels of the percentages of supplies being held in warehouses are due to the need to maintain a minimum stock for cases of extreme emergency requiring extraordinary intervention on the part of the authorities responsible.

(e) The main reasons that the stocks of chlorine maintained by the Baghdad Water Authority are adequate for less than one month, as indicated in paragraph 55, while they should be sufficient for not less than six months, are the evident dilatoriness in the supply situation, the extreme inadequacy of local output, the nature of the contracts concluded under the programme (which prevents the application of contractual sanctions to suppliers that do not abide by the terms of the contract) and the complexity of the procedures for the receipt, storage and use of this item, given that it is included in the schedule of dual-use items. The preliminary treatment stage is currently being suspended because consumption is being rationed to the maximum extent possible.

(f) Further to the information given in paragraph 56, it should be said that tests conducted by the Environmental Protection and Improvement Agency, the body legally responsible, show that the percentages for contaminated samples in many governorates, including Baghdad, have continued to be much higher than the permitted 5 per cent limit. There are two major reasons for this: the shortage of chlorine and the consequent shortcomings in the water treatment process, as mentioned in the previous paragraph; and the increased percentages of contaminants in untreated water.

3. Electricity

(a) With reference to the information given in paragraph 64, daily power cuts have now exceeded an average of 12 hours in the governorates and the number of consumers in all governorates with no electricity supply is 150,000, reflecting the state of deterioration in the sector. Among the reasons for this are the fact that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the 661 Committee have held up many contracts for spare parts for the sector on the pretext that they are "dual-use" items and on other flimsy grounds.

(b) The 700 megawatt net potential increase in power generation mentioned in paragraph 65 of the report is not factual. This is for the following reasons:

It is not possible to take readings at two different times, one at the beginning of a phase and the other at the end, and at a randomly determined time, and the average output of each station for the months of any current phase under the memorandum of understanding must be used instead;

The actual increase for the Bayji, Nasiriyah and Musayyib stations, as an average for the five months June to October, was a total of 100 megawatts according to the reports confirmed by Iraq;

The increase achieved came from the operation of Unit 1 at Musayyib, which was brought into operation using temporary expedients and by local efforts. The Unit's turbine was, however, damaged after three months of operation and the Unit is out of service while awaiting the arrival of spare parts;

The refitting work and the spare parts requested in various phases under the memorandum of understanding have helped to halt deterioration in some generating stations, but there has thus far been no clear and steady increase in generating capacity.

4. Transport and communications

(a) Paragraph 41 of the report refers to one application for the railway sector (No. 50891) that has been approved. It makes no reference to the 19 other contracts that have been pending or on hold for some time. The delayed approval of these contracts has an obvious impact on the repair of rolling stock and consequently on the speed with which items under the memorandum of understanding can be distributed, given that transport by rail is the cheapest and most assured method of delivery to the consumer.

(b) No reference is made to the 21 contracts for the communications sector, all of them pending, despite the fact that United Nations agencies and technical programmes have carried out field visits and have been given the clarifications requested concerning the need for the contract items and their importance for the implementation of the memorandum of understanding.

5. Education

(a) Paragraph 68 of the report refers to the fact that vocational education continues to suffer from a lack of equipment, computers and vehicles and a shortage of spare parts. It states that the Ministry of Education printing press is producing at less than 10 per cent of its installed capacity and that UNICEF is seeking to assess the need to enhance its production capacity. Regrettably, the report does not explain the main reason for the emergence of this problem, namely the dilatory approval of contracts and the holds placed on them by the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States and United Kingdom representatives are well known for their position of rejecting the overwhelming majority of contracts for the supply of computers to all Iraqi institutions and for all applications.

(b) Paragraph 70 of the report refers to the lack of basic requirements for higher education (journals and computers) but does not diagnose the reasons or recommend a remedy.

6. Agriculture

Paragraph 59 indicates that some 460,000 sheep, goats and cattle have died because they could not be vaccinated against disease. It does not, however, give the reason for these losses, namely delay or failure to approve the processing of contracts for veterinary vaccines on the part of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the 661 Committee.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF
ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION
RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 23 November 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a Chairman's summary on the Extraordinary Liechtenstein Colloquium on Peace and the Future in South-Eastern Europe, which was held from 17 to 20 June 1999 in Triesenberg, Liechtenstein (see annex). This meeting was held within the wider framework of the Liechtenstein Research Programme on Self-Determination at the Woodrow Wilson School of Princeton University (United States of America). The Extraordinary Liechtenstein Colloquium was informal and off-the-record in nature. The summary is thus the sole responsibility of the Director of the Liechtenstein Research Programme, who acted as Chairman of the Colloquium, and does not purport to reflect the positions taken by individual participants.

I would be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 10, 20, 81 and 115, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Claudia FRITSCHE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Extraordinary Liechtenstein Colloquium on Peace and the Future in South-Eastern Europe held 17-20 June 1999 at Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein

Chairman's Summary

Background

The Liechtenstein Colloquium is a biannual conference devoted to informed and frank discussions of a specific topic with the goal of advancing peace and prosperity in our world. The Colloquia are multidisciplinary, incorporating the worlds of diplomacy, academia, and international business, and a summary of the meetings is usually published. The Colloquia address issues of peace and security with independent, intergenerational, interdisciplinary and international participation, in a private and not-for-attribution setting.

The Liechtenstein Colloquium was established in the 1980s by Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber with the gracious support and encouragement of H.S.H. Prince Hans Adam II von und zu Liechtenstein. The Colloquium is under the auspices of the Princely House of Liechtentein and Princeton University's Liechtenstein Research Program on Self-Determination (LRPSD). The Extraordinary Colloquium on Peace and the Future in South-Eastern Europe was supported by the Princely House of Liechtenstein, the Government of Liechtenstein, and LGT Bank in Liechtenstein AG.

Among the six Colloquia in the past decade, the ones on "The Danger of Balkanization" in fall of 1993 and "The Geopolitical Effects of the Dayton Accord" in fall of 1995, dealt with the crisis of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and its regional impact. The 1993 meeting contributed to paving the way for the international recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Objectives, Context, and Issues for Discussion

This year's Extraordinary Liechtenstein Colloquium, chaired by Professor Danspeckgruber, was held to examine and develop/discuss feasible, credible and manageable models for solutions – in the strategic, humanitarian, political, and economic spheres – to provide for peace, stability, and prosperity in South-Eastern Europe. The Colloquium, of course, focussed on the aftermath of the Kosovo refugee crisis and the NATO intervention in Serbia; the sessions were held just as KFOR troops began moving into the Province of Kosovo. The topics of discussion were broad and covered issues applicable to the entire region of South-Eastern Europe. The Colloquium encouraged an open, unrestricted, and constructive dialogue that in-

cluded both the practical and the theoretical, as well as unconventional ideas and solutions.

The participants contributed in their personal capacity to the discussions of five major issues covered each at separate sessions. A keynote speaker started each session by presenting the topic and the most relevant points of discussion. The participants were encouraged to give due overall consideration to the following additional topics:

- the sub-regional and regional framework.
- the potential for regional cooperation/integration into the European Union, and how the integrative role of the EU could "europeanize" the entire region.
- domestic and regional programs to facilitate: Repatriation, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Regionalization .
- the extent to which the "Europeanization" of the region could promote the reconstruction of its infrastructure and the recreation of regional cooperation networks.
- fighting crime of all types and maintaining basic individual security.
- for the children and adolescents: (objective) education and professional training, programs to prevent unemployment and keep children off the streets, and psychological counseling for the youngest suffering from war/refugee-related trauma.
- democratization – along with the protection of moderate leaders and (their) opposition parties.
- religious and cultural issues – and how they interact with local political culture.
- regional security, stability, and arms control, affected through regional demilitarization and arms-control regimes buttressed with verification and other confidence-building measures.
- the interests of the community versus the interests of the nation-state.
- the role of outside powers as it relates to regional security cooperation, specifically NATO vis-a-vis the Russian Federation.
- the influence of the outside world coming particularly from the diaspora, refugees, allies, and other sources.

Summary of Sessions

The following summary was made by the Chair of the Colloquium on the basis of the discussions between participants at individual session. The summary does in no way purport to reflect the opinions of and/or positions taken by participants, nor to offer a complete overview of the discussion. It is the sole responsibility of the Chairman.

Multiethnicity versus Homogeneity

The question was raised whether it was possible to have a multiethnic state in the Balkan region. Some participants recognized grounds for optimism, and pointed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as a model for ethnic cohabitation. Others argued that multiethnicity would never work in the Balkans, and drew attention to the danger that Macedonia's Albanian population would become a new under-class. If the Kosovo situation were not to be stabilized, it was argued, it would in due course endanger the future and stability of Macedonia.

Role of other interested countries

The future role of the Russian Federation in Kosovo was debated. In particular, it was questioned whether the Russian executive, military and foreign policy apparatus were all working toward the same policy goals in the Balkans. The role of Turkey in the region was also discussed, specifically the ways in which the Ankara-Athens relationship influences Turkey's position.

Children and the youth

The Kosovo conflict has had a particularly disastrous effect on children, due in large part to the fact that one out of every four Kosovars is younger than 12 years of age. Deep concern was raised about the psychological state of this new generation, raised in a time of war. Special attention must be paid to the needs of children and teenagers in the post-conflict period, as current family and educational structures may be inadequate to deal with post-traumatic stress and other emotional problems caused by life as a refugee and losing one's family members. It was noted that the Albanian Ministry of Education had devised summer courses for Kosovar children to respond to some of these needs until it was safe to return to Kosovo. These programs had no financial support, however, and the teachers were often asked to carry them out voluntarily.

Cost on Albania and the Republic of Macedonia

Albania and the Republic of Macedonia had both received a large number of refugees. Refugees accounted for 18 percent of the population of Macedonia, which had imposed an enormous burden on the already strained governmental resources. Support from the international community had not been sufficient to cover all the needs. Moreover, most of the funds provided in the form of international aid was going to nongovernmental organization (NGOs), rather than to the government (in Albania, only 10 percent of the aid was channeled through the governmental). Bilateral cooperation between Tirana and Skopje was suggested to strengthen their respective international positions.

Ownership of the Reconstruction Program

There was general consensus that for the reconstruction of Kosovo to work, aid organizations would need to directly engage the local population and include them as active managers of the projects. The relief efforts should avoid turning the Kosovar Albanians into wards of the international community. The decision to appoint a civilian High Representative from the EU as well as the absence of any locally available civil servants were two significant problems. The term "competing philanthropic imperialism" was used to describe how Kosovo would be further victimized if these two main problems were solved. One must always be aware of the potential danger that powerful philanthropic organizations and actors may try to pursue objectives in their own interest rather than towards the needs emanating from the local situation.

Refugee Return

At the time of the meetings (June 1999), participants' discussions were based on estimates that 10 percent of the refugees would return immediately, while another 50 percent would return before the start of winter. Several participants argued that any efforts aimed at preventing the return of refugees were unlikely to prove successful; they would return no matter what the international community advised them to do. Since most returning refugees would be re-building their own houses by themselves, it was proposed that the best assistance would be to provide them with the means for the rebuilding. It was also noted that the flow of Kosovar returnees might not be unidirectional: some people who returned to Bosnia after the war were so devastated by what they found that they returned to their host country. The most important lesson is that both the rapid exodus of refugees (due to "ethnic cleansing") as well as the nearly equally rapid return have taken the relevant international organizations by surprise and to a certain degree unprepared for the scale of the problems.

Leadership

The point was raised often that Serbia needed to provide the international community with a credible alternative to the present regime in Belgrade. If such an alternative appeared, the international community should be prepared to assist the Serbian opposition directly. While the participants agreed that there was a need for political change in Serbia, there was no

consensus on how these changes could or should be achieved. Some participants considered it necessary that Serbia change from within, while others argued that domestic political oppression and control of the media within Serbia made external pressure an indispensable element in any effort to change the domestic political situation.

Elections

Regarding Kosovo, the view was expressed that the international community tends to view elections as a panacea for overcoming the democratic deficiencies in post-conflict situations. It was argued that the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, were conducted prematurely and with negative consequences. The risks associated with premature elections include domestic radicalization, the formation of ethnically-based political parties, and the entrenchment of those already in power.

The same line of argument was applied to Serbia. As long as opposition in Serbia was divided and weak, and as long as no unified movement existed to replace the Milosevic regime, there would be little chance for electoral success. The view was also expressed that certain "opposition leaders" were still making political deals with President Milosevic behind the scenes. The point was also made that the more time would pass, the better were the chances for President Milosevic to regain control. The international community should try its utmost to foster the development of a completely new Serbian leadership – exactly how was left unanswered; it is very difficult to replace a dictatorial regime through an election as such elections are not always democratic.

Civil Society

There was agreement that the region needed a new social contract based on institutions that foster participation. The private sector, the church, local government, and a free and pluralistic media could play an important role. While an internal development is a prerequisite for democratization, external assistance and practical lessons in democracy-building and democratic culture were also needed. Moreover the democratization process would only be partially successful if the region continued to ignore and did not deal frankly with its recent past. The experience of post-World War II Germany could serve as a positive example for how to deal with a nation's history – though it is difficult to compare Yugoslavia to Germany or the Balkans to Central Europe.

The media play a key role in shaping public opinion in the region. Returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) should be provided with radio receivers, and a radio station should be established to broadcast over the territory of Kosovo as well as over Serbia.

Targeting Assistance and Aid to Serbia

The Western countries had promised that Serbia would not receive reconstruction aid as long as President Milosevic remained in power. Serbia would however continue to receive

humanitarian aid. In this context, it was discussed where the ambiguous line between "humanitarian aid" and "reconstruction" should be drawn. It became clear that such a line would be somewhat arbitrary and artificial. Some participants argued that the definition of "humanitarian aid" should be widened so as to include the re-establishment of electricity, water supplies, communications, and certain other important infrastructure projects (bridges, roads, and railways) that were also of vital importance for neighboring states. In order to assist the neighboring states and help the region as a whole, it was suggested that the international community could undertake certain reconstruction projects with or without the acquiescence of the Yugoslav government.

How, then, would it be possible to help the people of Serbia without simultaneously giving succor to the current regime? This difficult question was never fully answered. Abstaining from giving assistance to Serbia would have serious repercussions for the recovery of the region as a whole – the neighboring states would be affected. In light of the region's interdependence, it was advised that a comprehensive long-term strategy for the Balkans be adopted. Some participants were of the view that for a successful stabilization of the domestic situation in and the reintegration of Serbia into the international community it was important to indicate to its people that the "outside world" was not hostile towards Serbia nor the Serbian people, but willing to provide assistance. In order to stabilize the uncertain domestic situation and to open Serbia for the concerns of the international community it was important to send clear signals that the outside world is not only bombs but aid as well.

Disarmament

The point was raised that a "balance of power" philosophy should not be the basis for any future regional security framework. Such an outlook promotes the goal of military parity and deterrence, which could further exacerbate the security fears of neighboring states and encourage a regional arms race. Such an arms race would impose a serious strain on the already fragile economies of the region, to say nothing about increasing the likelihood of future war. Collective security, it was suggested, could be the basis for an alternative security concept, although no specific ideas for how this goal could be achieved were put forth.

The Role of the Market

The opinion was put forth that as economic forces tend to disregard ethnic rivalries, economic development is therefore a key ingredient for sustainable development. Building on the experience of Western Europe, the economic integration of the Balkans could constitute the basis for a lasting peace in the region. It was imperative, however, that this regional integration take place within the larger context of the European integration process. In addition to economic reconstruction, old structures and psychological patterns associated with the communist and autocratic legacy must be overcome.

Borders

It was debated whether peace in the Balkans could be achieved by redrawing international borders. On the one hand the situation on the ground seemed to evolve steadily towards a separation of Kosovo. Furthermore, insisting on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the most certain way of alicnating and radicalizing the KLA, which had insisted on independence for Kosovo. On the other hand, opening up the possibility of redrawing maps in the region could be a recipe for continued armed conflict in the region - no part of South-Eastern Europe was "ethnically pure", and the redrawing of borders would necessarily involve a massive displacement of population to create ethnic enclaves. Those against the redrawing of borders noted that the emphasis had shifted from concern over a "Greater Serbia" to concern over a "Greater Albania". Several participants stated emphatically and unequivocally that redrawing borders could never be a solution to the problems in the region and therefore should not even be considered. For them, regional integration and multiethnicity seem to be the only feasible solutions.

The Stability Pact

The view was expressed that at best the Stability Pact could facilitate the integration of the region into Europe; at worst, it would serve as a means of further containing the Balkans and separating them from the rest of the continent. Some concern was expressed about the underlying motives of the international community: beyond the "war of principles" waged against the Milosevic regime, there was also the political imperative of preventing a massive flow of refugees into European countries. The Schengen Accords concluded among the EU member states were presented as an example of further retrenchment of the Union.

The importance of the Stability Pact would lie in stabilizing the region by including it in the European integration process. Doubts were expressed if the political will for such an incorporation indeed existed on the part of the EU member states, and whether the financial means required would ever be made available. It was suggested that nationalism could be overcome by increasing cooperation within the region itself.

The attitude of NATO and the EU toward the region was also discussed. A reliance on the international community to end conflicts – hence "humanitarian intervention" – and to establish a civilian administration may lead to a renewal of the mandate regime. Such a regime is unacceptable to many who insist that the prevalent paradigm must be one of inclusion. The view was expressed that such inclusion and integration into Europe could only be achieved by way of a solution that provided for freedom of movement; doubts were expressed, whether the political will for such a solution existed.

Collective Guilt

Two diverging views were presented on whether the entire population of Serbia should to some extent share guilt for the atrocities committed against the Kosovar Albanians. Partici-

pants of the first view noted post-Apartheid South Africa's use of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (as well as the example of Germany after WWII) as convincing evidence of the important need for collective societal "soul-searching" by populations that have lived under a repressive regime. Reducing the guilt to one person, or to a small group of people, would hinder the possibility for reconciliation and lasting peace. Those of the opposite view, however, argued that the Serbians, far from being the regime's willing executioners, were themselves the biggest victims of the Belgrade regime.

Possible Recommendations

The following set of recommendations was elaborated by the Chair of the Colloquium on the basis of the discussions between participants at individual sessions. While the recommendations result from these discussions, they do not purport to reflect the opinions of and/or positions taken by participants; nor do these recommendations concern all points of the discussion. They are thus the sole responsibility of the Chairman.

Strategic Dimensions

Prioritize and support the establishment of internal security throughout Yugoslavia. Confiscate all firearms and arrest criminals immediately (especially those criminals recently released from prison for mop-up operations in Kosovo).

Beware of the potential spill-over violence into Montenegro, the Sanjak region, and/or Vojvodina; there may be the need of the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* around Kosovo and these regions.

Establish coherent and cohesive rules regarding decriminalization throughout Kosovo and ensure their consistent enforcement in all the KFOR sectors. Try to counteract also all kinds of illegal actions and behavior, including black market. Focus special attention on the behavior of the young returnees.

Integrate the KLA into a new civil administration, minimize their armaments, cut their arms supply roots, and eliminate potential infighting. The danger of alienation and radicalization should be countered through the involvement of KLA and its members in administrative and reconstruction processes.

An agreement on the comprehensive disarmament of the region should be concluded and implemented consistently by all parties and states concerned.

The process of disarmament, pacification and reconstruction should be started immediately. The oncoming winter, the upcoming U.S. elections, the increasing resentment of refugees in host countries, and growing donor fatigue all show that the time for achieving these priority goals is very short.

For the time being, no change of borders should be considered for the permanent status of Kosovo; rather a combination of maximum self-governance and autonomy, along with and regional integration under EU guidance, should be employed.

Domestic Policy Situation

President Milosevic and the current regime should be isolated from the negotiation process and their role eliminated wherever possible. The international community must make it clear to the Yugoslav population that reconstruction aid and economic assistance will come once Milosevic and his regime are no longer in power. Instead, support and assist the peoples of Yugoslavia whenever possible, independent of religious or ethnic efforts.
A combined strategy ought to be employed to combat organized crime (decriminalization), to encourage the development of new leaders (democratization), and to open the country to its neighbors (regionalization)

The West today repeats its mistake and invests too much hope in the already spent, traditional opposition, rather than helping to create new, non-corrupt, and uncompromised leaders; and taking a balanced and reasonable position vis-a-vis demands from Kosovar Albanians, Bosniaks, and Montenegrinians.

Those indicted by the ICTY anywhere in Croatia, Bosnia and Yugoslavia/Serbia and Kosovo have to be brought to justice – otherwise the crisis in the Balkans will simply continue and so will the U.S. and EU's costly involvement.

Focus on opposition leaders and their constituencies but beware of rivalries among and between those in Serbia and those in exile. Be careful regarding corrupt and compromised opposition leaders who are too embroiled with the region. Support should be given to the formation of independent media in the region. For example, the population could be provided with radios and other means of accessing and distributing information.

Assistance should be given especially to the young returning refugees in the form of counselling and education.

Support the establishment of another power center besides Belgrade within the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Involve KFOR military engineers in building bridges and urgent infrastructure projects. This eliminates the risk of having to negotiate with Milosevic while keeping the reconstruction funds out of his hands so he cannot capitalize on the beneficial effects of such projects.

Hold the Serbian leadership responsible for breaches of law. Bring to justice all those who are indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

whether they reside in Serbia, Croatia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do not condone any violence against other ethnic/religious groups. Beware of the influence of organized crime and the negligence of corrupt governments.

For the time being, do not push for elections in Kosovo or Serbia. In light of the fragile political situation, premature elections might consolidate the division of political allegiances along ethnic lines and ascertain a renewed victory of the nationalists.

Focus on modernization in an effort to combat the ideas and myths of 18th and 19th century nationalism prevalent in the region's oral history, family tradition, and identities. Promote the participation of women in all aspects of society, from politics to business to education. Promote the ideas of integration, multiple identities, European integration and equal opportunities for all peoples in the region, independent of their race, gender, or religion.

The development of a civil society should be supported and promoted . Train teachers, draw out young leaders (the generation below age 30) and bring women more into the decision-making process. Prepare for a conference of regional young leaders.

Humanitarian Dimension

Humanitarian assistance must be distributed equally, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation. Subjecting the region to "competing philanthropic imperialism," i.e., a situation where foundations, NGOs, etc. try to impose their policy and interests on the region irrespective of local needs, must be avoided. NGOs and incoming foreign aid should be coordinated via an international clearing house.

A hands-on approach to the reconstruction of the region should be adopted. The local population and particularly the local youth should be involved in objective needs assessment and be given the tools to start reconstruction projects. Encourage stewardship – the personal involvement of the local population in any international assistance and reconstruction project.

Economic and Regional Dimension

Long-term sustainability should characterize all humanitarian aid and reconstruction projects. A comprehensive vision of regional aid and assistance should be established.

Encourage bilateral cooperation among the neighboring states in South-Eastern Europe, in particular between Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. Emphasis should be placed on financial cooperation, infrastructure projects, and education.

Try to establish as soon as possible a common currency zone amongst the states of the former Yugoslavia and their neighbors.

/...

A customs union in South-Eastern Europe should be created so as to allow for greater interregional interaction and for the possibility of negotiating interregional currency arrangements. This would also assist in combating corruption and fraud while enhancing bilateral arrangements.

The formation of new legal, financial, and fiscal institutions should be supported at both the national and regional levels.